














WEB OF LIES: HATE SPEECH, PSEUDONYMS, THE 
INTERNET, IMPERSONATOR TROLLS, AND FAKE 
JEWS IN THE ERA OF FAKE NEWS 
YITZCHAK BESSER1 
 
This Article discusses the problem of “hate-speech impersonator 
trolls,” that is, those who impersonate minorities through the use of 
false identities online, and then use those false identities to harm those 
minorities through disinformation campaigns and false-flag operations. 
Solving this problem requires a change to the status quo, either through 
the passage of a new statute targeting hate-speech impersonator trolls 
or through the modification of Section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act. In this Article, I discuss the scope and severity of hate-
speech impersonator-trolling, as well as relevant jurisprudence on the 
First Amendment, hate speech, anonymity, and online communications. 
I then present proposals and recommendations to counter and combat 
hate-speech impersonator trolls. 
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I. Introduction  
 
In August 2019, veteran journalist Yair Rosenberg uncovered a network 
of fake social media accounts that claimed to be the digital profiles of 
Jewish people.2 The people behind these fake accounts used 
stereotypical Jewish names like “David Goldberg” and “Chaim 
Adelberg,” alongside stolen photos of real Jewish people.3 The fake 
accounts were created shortly after a thread on a 4chan message board—
described by Slate as a “white supremacist breeding ground”4—called 
for “a massive movement of fake Jewish profiles” on Facebook and 
Twitter.5 Posts on the board transparently discussed the aim behind the 
use of these “fake Jews”: promoting anti-Semitism, provoking 
infighting, and fomenting a hatred of leftist ideologies.6 This was not 
the first time that Rosenberg had to deal with online anti-Semites; he 
fought against them in 2017 shortly after the election of former 
President Donald J. Trump.7 He dubbed these white supremacists 
“impersonator trolls” and “digital Nazis.”8 
 
On New Year’s Day 2020, the trolls were at it again.9 This time, they 





2 Rachelle Hampton, 4chan Trolls Impersonated Jewish Twitter Users. Again., SLATE (Aug. 
21, 2019, 11:04 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2019/08/4chan-trolls-impersonated-jewish-
twitter-users-again.html [https://perma.cc/LC2R-3LQH]. 
3 Id.  
4 Id.  
5 Id.  
6 Id.  
7 Yair Rosenberg, Confessions of a Digital Nazi Hunter, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/27/opinion/digital-nazi-hunter-trump.html 
[https://perma.cc/S5J4-BQ39]. 
8 Id.  
9 Donie O’Sullivan, A Fake Twitter Account Stirred Tensions Between Jews and African 
Americans. Trolls Celebrated., CNN (Jan. 2, 2020, 3:04 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/02/tech/twitter-fake-account-anti-semitic-new-york-
attacks/index.html [https://perma.cc/V9TZ-GKSU]. 
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enmity between Jewish and Black Americans in the wake of widely 
reported, violent anti-Semitic attacks against Jews in New York.10 In 
response to this trolling operation, Rosenberg wrote: “The white 
supremacists on Twitter are doing what they regularly do, especially in 
the wake of tragedy: impersonating minorities to sow hatred and pit 
them against each other. Right now, we’re seeing fake Jews saying anti-
black things. As ever, this is on @Twitter to deal with.”11 
 
These digital false-flag operations involved the impersonation of a 
member of a protected class12 in order to disparage, malign, spread 
misinformation about, and/or incite hatred against that protected class.13 
Setting aside subjects like identity theft and fraud, these acts of online 
hate speech present complicated issues related to cyberspace law and 
the limits of First Amendment protections. 
 
This Article will examine those issues in detail. Specifically, it will 
investigate the following question: Presuming that it is legal to both (1) 
impersonate on the internet a member of a protected class and (2) 
express hate speech on the internet, should it be illegal to do both at the 
same time? Framed another way, is it legal to (1) assume a false identity 
masquerading as a member of a protected class so as to co-opt the 
credibility and legitimacy implicitly granted to genuine members of that 







10 Id.  
11 Id.  
12 The term “protected class” is defined as a  
group[] protected from the employment discrimination by law. These 
groups include men and women on the basis of sex; any group which 
shares a common race, religion, color, or national origin; people over 40; 
and people with physical or mental handicaps. Every U.S. citizen is a 
member of some protected class and is entitled to the benefits of [Equal 
Employment Opportunity (EEO)] law. However, the EEO laws were 
passed to correct a history of unfavorable treatment of women and 
minority group members. 
EEO Terminology, NAT’L. ARCHIVES (Aug. 15, 2016), 
https://www.archives.gov/eeo/terminology.html#p [https://perma.cc/S823-XGQF]. 
13 Rosenberg, supra note 7. 
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Part I of this Article details the modus operandi of an impersonator troll 
and discusses several examples of impersonator trolls attacking 
minorities.14 It also considers the impact that impersonator trolls can 
have on extremists in the physical world.15 Part I also discusses how the 
Russian government uses impersonator trolls to foster social discord and 
internal divisions in the United States.16 Part II reviews the legal 
principles and case law related to hate speech and the First 
Amendment.17 It also covers jurisprudence surrounding anonymity and 
the ability to create a fictional identity on the internet.18 Part III analyzes 
the laws and policies governing social media platforms, and their 
obligations and efforts to combat online hate speech (or the lack 
thereof).19 
 
Having established the body of relevant law, this Article concludes with 
Part IV, which returns to the question articulated at the outset: Is it 
illegal to masquerade online as a member of a protected class, and then 
foment hatred, spread disinformation, and inflame racial tensions?20 
Part IV also proposes ways to counter and combat impersonator trolls 
that promulgate hate speech, spread disinformation, and attack 
minorities.21 
 
II. Impersonation as a Form of Hate Speech 
 
Impersonator-trolling is one form of a broader phenomenon of digital 
deception called “sockpuppeting.”22 Broadly defined, a “sockpuppet” is 
just “a user account that is controlled by an individual (or puppetmaster) 
who controls at least one other user account,” but the term is typically 





14 See infra Parts I.A, I.C. 
15 See infra Part I.B. 
16 See infra Part I.D. 
17 See infra Part II.A. 
18 See infra Part II.B. 
19 See infra Part III. 
20 See infra Part IV. 
21 See infra Part IV. 
22 Srijan Kuman et al., An Army of Me: Sockpuppets in Online Discussion Communities, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 26TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WORLD WIDE WEB 857, 857 
(2017), available at https://thewebconf.org/proceedings/www2017/proceedings/p857.pdf. 
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deceiving others.”23 Sockpuppets are often used for underhanded 
commercial dealings, like sabotaging competitors on social media 
platforms or posting fake product reviews in online marketplaces like 
Amazon.24 In January 2019, the New York Attorney General’s Office 
became the first law enforcement agency to find that selling fake social 
media engagement is illegal, with Attorney General Letitia James 
warning those seeking to “make a quick buck by lying to honest 
Americans” that her office was “sending a clear message that anyone 
profiting off of deception and impersonation is breaking the law and will 
be held accountable.”25 Sockpuppeting can also serve political or social 
purposes, either through the creation of fake grassroots supporters—a 
practice known as “astroturfing”26—or through impersonator trolls’ 
efforts to attack minorities, spread hate speech, and foment civil unrest. 
 
A. Defining a Hate-Speech Impersonator Troll 
 
Hate-speech impersonator trolls “are not content to harass Jews and 
other minorities on Twitter; they seek to assume their identities and then 
defame them.”27 To do so, an impersonator troll will first create or steal 
“an online photo of a Jew, Muslim, African-American or other 
minority—typically one with clear identifying markers, like a 
yarmulke-clad Hasid or a woman in hijab.”28 The troll will then use this 





23 Id. at 858.   
24 David Wagner, Sockpuppet Reviews Aren’t Just Unethical, They’re also Unconvincing, 
ATLANTIC (Sept. 4, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/archive/2012/09/sockpuppet-
reviews-arent-just-unethicaltheyre-also-unconvincing/323992/ [https://perma.cc/BGS5-J3TB].  
25 Press Release, New York State Off. Att’y Gen., Attorney General James Announces 
Groundbreaking Settlements with Sellers of Fake Followers and “Likes” on Social Media 
(Jan. 30, 2019), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2019/attorney-general-james-announces-
groundbreaking-settlement-sellers-fake-followers [https://perma.cc/H4G6-EHZW].   
26 Franziska Keller et al., It’s Not Easy to Spot Disinformation on Twitter. Here’s What We 
Learned from 8 Political ‘Astroturfing’ Campaigns, WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2019 6:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/10/28/its-not-easy-spot-disinformation-twitter-
heres-what-we-learned-political-astroturfing-campaigns/ [https://perma.cc/J29U-EMAR]. For 
an example of astroturfing within the context of alt-right propaganda, see Charlie Warzel, 
How the Alt-Right Manipulates the Internet’s Biggest Commenting Platform, BUZZFEED NEWS 
(June 5, 2018, 9:58 AM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/charliewarzel/how-the-alt-
right-manipulates-disqus-comment-threads [https://perma.cc/M5SQ-T26P]. 
27 Rosenberg, supra note 7. 
28 Id. 
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their social media profile with ethnic and progressive terms like 
“Jewish,” “Zionist,” “Muslim,” or “enemy of the alt-right.”29 
 
Having created their false identity online, the impersonator troll will 
then “insert themselves into conversations with high-profile Twitter 
users—conversations that are often seen by tens of thousands of 
followers—and proceed to say horrifically racist things.”30 Thus, the 
troll defames an entire community, because “unsuspecting readers 
glancing through their feed are given the impression that someone who 
looks like, say, a religious Jew or Muslim is outlandishly bigoted.”31 
This deception is effective because casual users rarely realize that the 
images are stolen or fake, nor do they read through that account’s history 
to determine that it only shares racist posts and is therefore unlikely to 
be a legitimate account.32 
 
B. Anti-Semitic Impersonator Trolls and Their Influence 
on Racist Murderers 
 
A post on a white supremacist thread on 4chan pulled back the curtain 
on the anti-Semitic agenda of some impersonator trolls.33 The post 
called for impersonating Jews online; its reasoning was that “[s]ince 
Jews shapeshift into whites anytime they want, we [impersonator trolls] 
can do the same to them.”34 The post noted that “LARPing [live-action 
role-playing] as a Jew has the benefit of being uncensored by big tech” 
and that impersonator trolls posing as Jews “also have the benefit of 
labeling anyone an anti semite [sic] who disagrees with you.”35 “Use 
this to your advantage,” the post counseled.36 
 
“Being a Jew, you are able to subvert Jews themselves,” the post 






30 Id.  
31 Id.  
32 Id.  
33 Hampton, supra note 2. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id.  
37 Id. 
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You can take the blame for world events. Post redpill facts about your 
fellow Jews. Slave trade, monetary facts, mass media, porn industry 
etc…etc… [sic].”38 
 
The post then took another anti-Semitic turn, writing that 
 
[s]ince Jewishness is 100% based on supremacism, you 
can use the same tactics they have used to dismantle our 
own society. You can push for more diversity in Israel, 
for example. More race mixing…etc…etc…If your 
fellow Jews disagree, call them Nazi’s [sic], racists, 
bigots, xenophobes. LOVE WILL WIN. Bring ICE 
detainees to Israel.39 
 
It is easy to see how this online anti-Semitism can lead to real-world 
attacks. As one example, domestic terrorist Robert Bowers killed eleven 
people and injured six more during a shooting attack on the Tree of Life 
- Or L’Simcha synagogue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on October 27, 
2018.40 This was the deadliest attack on American Jews in the history 
of the country.41 
 
Bowers posted a large number of anti-Semitic slurs, stereotypes, and 
conspiracy theories on Gab, a social media platform.42 Neo-Nazis, white 







40 Justin Carissimo, Pittsburgh Shooting Suspect Makes Court Appearance; Feds Seek Death 
Penalty, CBS NEWS (Oct. 29, 2018, 7:24 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/live-
news/pittsburgh-shooting-synagogue-today-suspect-robert-bowers-squirrel-hill-live-updates-
2018-10-29/ [https://perma.cc/QV7X-XAFV]. 
41 Emma Green, The Fight to Make Meaning out of a Massacre, ATLANTIC (Sept. 29, 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/09/pittsburgh-politics-violence-gun-
reform/598885/ [https://perma.cc/UC6E-YTFS]. 
42 Jason Silverstein, Robert Bowers, Pittsburgh Shooting Suspect, Was Avid Poster of Anti-
Semitic Content on Gab, CBS NEWS (Oct. 28, 2018, 12:03 AM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/robert-bowers-gab-pittsburgh-shooting-suspect-today-live-
updates-2018-10-27/ [https://perma.cc/TV6L-TXV3]; see also Rita Katz, Inside the Online 
Cesspool of Anti-Semitism that Housed Robert Bowers, POLITICO (Oct. 29, 2018), 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/10/29/inside-the-online-cesspool-of-anti-
semitism-that-housed-robert-bowers-221949 [https://perma.cc/J39R-XRSN]. 
240 THE OHIO STATE TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17.2 
 
 
even been dubbed “Twitter for racists.”43 While extremists may favor 
sites like Gab and 4chan for communicating amongst themselves, “the 
popularity of mainstream mega-platforms like Twitter, Facebook and 
YouTube has created environments in which misinformation and hate 
can multiply, and where extremists can attempt to convert—or ‘red pill,’ 
in the parlance of right-wing Internet activists—a new generation to 
their cause.”44 For reference, Gab has approximately 480,000 users, 
while Twitter has over 300 million people using the site every month.45 
 
Bowers wrote that Jews were the enemy of Christian people of European 
descent, whom he viewed as the “chosen people.”46 He also claimed that 
Jews would engage in a false-flag attack as “one of the final desperate 
attempts by the jewish [sic] international oligarchy to maintain power 
in the face of collapsing public trust” in the mainstream media.47 He 
focused on HIAS, a Jewish group that helps refugees of all faiths settle 
in the U.S., and claimed that the group was bringing illegal immigrants 
and “hostile invaders” into the country.48 Just before his murderous 
attack on the synagogue, Bowers posted, “HIAS likes to bring invaders 
in that kill our people. I can’t sit by and watch my people get 
slaughtered. Screw your optics. I’m going in.”49 
 
Bowers was influenced by a sockpuppet account that went by the names 
“Jack Corbin” and “Pale Horse,”50 and Bowers himself influenced 





43 Lois Beckett, Pittsburgh Shooting: Suspect Railed Against Jews and Muslims on Site Used 
by ‘Alt-Right’, GUARDIAN (Oct. 27, 2018, 6:49 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2018/oct/27/pittsburgh-shooting-suspect-antisemitism [https://perma.cc/FA8J-MVTC]. 
44 Kevin Roose, On Gab, an Extremist-Friendly Site, Pittsburg Shooting Suspect Aired His 
Hatred in Full, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/28/us/gab-
robert-bowers-pittsburgh-synagogue-shootings.html [https://perma.cc/3AHL-3FQE]. 
45 Abby Vesoulis, How Gab Became the Social Media Site Where the Pittsburgh Suspect’s 
Alleged Anti-Semitism Thrived, TIME (Oct. 27, 2018, 7:41 PM), 
https://time.com/5437006/gab-social-media-robert-bowers/ [https://perma.cc/WMF8-7KB5]. 
46 Rich Lord, How Robert Bowers Went from Conservative to White Nationalist, PITT. POST-
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and wounded three others in a shooting attack on a Chabad synagogue 
near San Diego, California, on April 27, 2019.51 In his manifesto 
published online prior to the attack, Earnest celebrated the anonymous 
activists on 8chan who helped to spread his anti-Semitic beliefs.52 
 
According to the FBI, the number of hate crimes targeting Jews spiked 
in 2017, which saw a seven-year high in the number of these crimes.53 
While 2018’s number of anti-Semitic hate crimes was lower than that 
of 2017, the number of violent crimes like arson, felony assault, and 
murder increased.54 
 
Given the size, scale, and scope of online anti-Semitism—and its 
influence on real-world attackers like Bowers and Earnest—it is not 
hard to imagine how an impersonator troll could push some other digital 
bigot into acting on their hatred in the real world. While masquerading 
as Jews, impersonator trolls could create online content that feeds into 
extremists’ anti-Semitic beliefs. Those extremists would then spread 
these allegedly Jewish pieces of content online to support their calls for 
attacks on Jews. 
 
C. “Digital Blackface”: Impersonator Trolls Targeting 
Women of Color 
 
Impersonator trolls are not limited to anti-Semitism. In 2013-14, 
impersonator trolls engaged in “Operation: Lollipop,” “a propaganda 
campaign run largely by members of the Men's Rights and Pick-Up 





51 Ben Collins & Andrew Blankstein, Anti-Semitic Open Letter Posted Online Under Name of 
Chabad Synagogue Shooting Suspect, NBC NEWS (Apr. 28, 2019, 12:37 PM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/us-news/anti-semitic=posted-online-under-chabad-synagogue-
n999211 [https://perma.cc/T8AQ-LUG3]. 
52 Open Letter by John Earnest, accused Poway synagogue shooter (April 2019), available at 
https://bcsh.bard.edu/files/2020/05/Earnest-Manifesto-042719.pdf. 
53 Nigel Chiwaya, It’s Not Just New York: Anti-Jewish Attacks Are Part of a Wave of ‘More 




242 THE OHIO STATE TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17.2 
 
 
embarrass the online social justice community.”55 A since-deleted 
Tumblr blog associated with Operation: Lollipop described the 
“Privilege Wars of 2013” as an effort to “infiltrate feminist movements 
with [T]witter accounts” and thereby use fake accounts to turn activists 
against one another.56 
 
Impersonator trolls waged a similar campaign in 2014 with the 
#EndFathersDay hashtag on Twitter.57 “To casual observers online, 
#EndFathersDay appeared to be the work of militant feminists, most of 
whom were seemingly women of color,” to the point that people were 
easily “lured into believing a stereotype of black women.”58 In reality, 
this Twitter disinformation campaign was the work of impersonator 
trolls seeking “to engender exactly the vitriol that pundits so readily 
stepped up to spew.”59 Commentators and talking heads like Tucker 
Carlson, Ashe Schow, Dan McLaughlin, and Ben Shapiro all cited the 
#EndFathersDay hashtag in their criticisms of “progressivism” or the 
“feminist outrage machine.”60 
 
It took the efforts of activists like L’Nasah Crockett and Shafiqah 
Hudson to expose this impersonator troll scheme.61 Hudson created a 
new Twitter hashtag, #YourSlipIsShowing, designed to help women 
flag so-called “black feminist” accounts that they suspected of being 
trolls.62 Crockett found the original 4chan post outlining the 
#EndFathersDay campaign as “part of a crusade by men’s rights 
activists, pickup artists, and miscellaneous misogynists hoping to 





55 Ryan Broderick, Activists Are Outing Hundreds of Twitter Users Believed To Be 4chan 




57 Id.; Rachelle Hampton, The Black Feminists Who Saw the Alt-Right Threat Coming, SLATE 
(Apr. 23, 2019, 5:45 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2019/04/black-feminists-alt-right-
twitter-gamergate.html [https://perma.cc/3ECL-ZQPH]. 
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related to race and class.”63 Using the #YourSlipIsShowing tag, 
Crockett posted screenshots of this 4chan post on Twitter, presenting to 
the world her evidence of the premeditation behind the impersonator-
trolling campaign.64 
 
Shireen Mitchell, founder of Stop Online Violence Against Women, 
described impersonator-troll attacks against Black women as “digital 
blackface.”65 “You use the stereotype to project that all black women 
are angry, so that anything we say or do becomes part of a 
disinformation and dismissal campaign,” she told The Daily Beast in 
May 2019 after an impersonator troll used the stolen identity of a dead 
transgender activist to support former President Trump.66 
 
D. Russian Impersonator Trolls Attacking America Along 
Racial Lines 
 
Governments have also begun using impersonator trolls to foment 
discord and disinformation, with one writer noting that “what does seem 
clear is that the misinformation, bot networks, and weaponized trolls 
that Twitter did little to curb back in 2014 were a ‘dry run’ for the 
presidential campaign two years later.”67 In 2017, CNN linked a social 
media campaign called “Blacktivist” with the Russian government, 
alleging that Moscow was using Blacktivist accounts on Facebook and 
Twitter to “amplify racial tensions during the U.S. presidential 
election.”68 The people behind these accounts claimed to be Black 
Americans, but were actually Russian impersonator trolls seeking to 






64 Id.  
65 Kelly Weill, ‘Digital Blackface’: Pro-Trump Trolls Are Impersonating Black People on 




67 See Hampton, supra note 57. 
68 Donie O’Sullivan & Dylan Byers, Exclusive: Fake Black Activist Accounts Linked to 








The Russian government also created false online identities that were 
designed to hold diametrically opposed opinions on political and social 
issues, so as to rile up hatred among the passionate supporters of those 
opinions.70 “Some Internet Research Agency-created accounts 
pretended to be Muslim groups, others anti-Muslim activists. They were 
advocates of Black liberation on one hand and its most fervent American 
critics on the other—whatever was necessary to aggravate long-standing 
and very real American divisions.”71 The Internet Research Agency 
(“IRA”) is the “notorious Russian ‘troll’ farm” that U.S. Special 
Counsel Robert S. Mueller III investigated following Trump’s narrow 
electoral win in 2016.72 On February 16, 2018, Mueller indicted thirteen 
Russian individuals and three Russian organizations, including the IRA, 
for “engaging in operations to interfere with U.S. political and electoral 
processes, including the 2016 presidential election” through the use of 
false personas and the “exploitation of social media networks.”73 
 
III. First Amendment Jurisprudence 
 
Modern technology allows for massive disinformation and propaganda 
campaigns that “pepper vulnerable targets relentlessly with their 
messages in the hope of wearing them down and converting them.”74 
Simply put, the speed, scope, and “information overload” of the internet 
can overwhelm users, leaving them vulnerable to bad actors seeking to 
spread fake news online through the use of sockpuppets and false 





70 Spencer Ackerman, Gideon Resnick & Ben Collins, Leaked: Secret Documents from 
Russia’s Election Trolls, DAILY BEAST (Oct. 26, 2018, 7:53 AM), 
https://www.thedailybeast.com/exclusive-secret-documents-from-russias-election-trolls-leak 
[https://perma.cc/9K6H-5CSL]. 
71 Id.  
72 Exposing Russia’s Effort to Sow Discord Online: The Internet Research Agency and 
Advertisements, U.S. H. REP. PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTEL., 
https://intelligence.house.gov/social-media-content/ [https://perma.cc/67FL-TYBV]. 
73 Id.  
74 See Warzel, supra note 26.   
75 Filippo Menczer & Thomas Hills, Information Overload Helps Fake News Spread, and 
Social Media Knows It, SCI. AM. (Dec. 1, 2020), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/information-overload-helps-fake-news-spread-
and-social-media-knows-it/ 
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Web by centuries.76 Thus, to understand the legal framework 
surrounding online anonymity and hate speech, one must first 
understand traditional First Amendment protections and the evolution 
of free speech jurisprudence. 
 
A. A Foundation in First Amendment Law 
 
One of the most influential cases in First Amendment jurisprudence is 
Brandenburg v. Ohio.77 In 1969, Ohio convicted Clarence Brandenburg, 
the leader of a local Ku Klux Klan (“KKK”) group, under the Ohio 
Criminal Syndicalism statute for “advocat[ing] … the duty, necessity, 
or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of 
terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform” 
and for “voluntarily assembl[ing] with any society, group, or 
assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of 
criminal syndicalism.”78 
 
Brandenburg invited a Cincinnati journalist to a KKK rally, which was 
filmed by the journalist and his crew.79 At the rally, KKK members 
made derogatory statements about Black Americans and Jews.80 
Additionally, Brandenburg himself made a speech in which he said, 
“We’re not a revengent [sic] organization, but if our President, our 
Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, 
Caucasian race, it’s possible that there might have to be some 
revengeance [sic] taken.”81 Brandenburg also declared that 400,000 
KKK members planned on marching on Congress.82 In a second speech, 
Brandenburg added: “Personally, I believe the nigger should be returned 







76 As one example, American Founding Father Benjamin Franklin is famed for writing Poor 
Richard’s Almanack under a pseudonym, as well as his “Silence Dogood” letters. Id.  
77 See generally Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
78 Id. at 444-45 (quoting Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2923.13). 
79 Id. at 445. 
80 Id. at 446. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 447. 




Brandenburg challenged the constitutionality of the Ohio Criminal 
Syndicalism statute under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.84 The 
Supreme Court upheld that challenge.85 In a per curiam decision, the 
Court emphasized the distinction between “mere advocacy” for 
“violence ‘as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform’” 
and “incitement to imminent lawless action.”86 The former is acceptable 
under the First Amendment, while the latter cannot be defended by the 
shield of free speech.87 Through this dichotomy, the Court established a 
principle: 
 
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free 
press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe 
advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except 
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing 
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce 
such action.88  
 
Thus, the statute was deemed unconstitutional, because it punished 
“mere advocacy” rather than “incitement to imminent lawless action.”89 
This “likely to incite or produce imminent lawless action” threshold has 
since become the standard for First Amendment cases of this kind. 
 
A pivotal forerunner to Brandenburg also related to the prohibition 
against speech inciting imminent lawless action, but framed this concept 
around the term “‘fighting’ words.”90 In that case, Chaplinsky v. State 
of New Hampshire, the appellant was a member of the Jehovah’s 
Witness faith who incited a riot by preaching his religion in a busy 
public square, allegedly insulting other religions, and calling his city’s 





84 Id. at 445.  
85 Id.  
86 Id. at 448-49.  
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 447. 
89 Id. at 449. 
90 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569 (1942). 
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government of Rochester [] Fascists or agents of Fascists.”91 Chaplinsky 
was convicted of violating a state statute mandating: 
 
No person shall address any offensive, derisive or 
annoying word to any other person who is lawfully in 
any street or other public place, nor call him by any 
offensive or derisive name, nor make any noise or 
exclamation in his presence and hearing with intent to 
deride, offend or annoy him, or to prevent him from 
pursuing his lawful business or occupation.92 
 
Chaplinsky challenged his conviction, alleging that it violated his right 
to free speech, and the Supreme Court took up the case.93 It upheld 
Chaplinsky’s conviction, and concluded that the New Hampshire statute 
was a valid restriction of the First Amendment.94 
 
Allowing the broadest scope to the language and purpose 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is well understood that 
the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and 
under all circumstances. There are certain well-defined 
and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention 
and punishment of which have never been thought to 
raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd 
and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting 
or ‘fighting’ words—those which by their very utterance 
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the 
peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are 
no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of 
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit 
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by 






91 Id. at 569. The “fascism” insult likely carried significantly more weigh in the midst of 
World War II than it would today. 
92 Id. at 569.  
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94 Id. at 573-74.  
95 Id. at 571-72. 
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The Court’s inclusion of the phrase “those which by their very utterance 
inflict injury” indicates that a statement does not have to incite imminent 
lawless action to fall out from underneath the aegis of the First 
Amendment. 96 A “statute narrowly drawn and limited to define and 
punish specific conduct lying within the domain of state power, the use 
in a public place of words likely to cause a breach of the peace” does 
not “contravene the constitutional right of free expression,” the Court 
concluded. This determination suggests the validity of any narrowly 
tailored statute criminalizing hate-speech impersonator-trolling.97 
 
Another hate-speech case occurred in 1977, when the Illinois Circuit 
Court of Cook County entered an injunction against the National 
Socialist Party of America, also known as the American Nazi Party.98 
The injunction barred the Nazis from: 
 
[m]arching, walking or parading in the uniform of the 
National Socialist Party of America; [m]arching, 
walking or parading or otherwise displaying the swastika 
on or off their person; [d]istributing pamphlets or 
displaying any materials which incite or promote hatred 
against persons of Jewish faith or ancestry or hatred 
against persons of any faith or ancestry, race or 
religion.99  
 
The American Nazi Party sought a stay pending appeal, and the case 
made its way up through the judicial system until it reached the Supreme 
Court.100 The Supreme Court mandated that the state court system 
review the Nazis’ stay application, and the case was remanded to the 
state court.101 
 
The Supreme Court of Illinois, in its subsequent decision on the issue, 





96 Id.  
97 See infra Part IV.A. 
98 Nat’l Socialist Party of Am. v. Vill. of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 43 (1977). 
99 Id.  
100 Id. at 44. 
101 Id.  
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entitled to First Amendment protections,” and “[i]ts display on uniforms 
or banners by those engaged in peaceful demonstrations cannot be 
totally precluded solely because that display may provoke a violent 
reaction by those who view it.”102 
 
The “unpopularity of views, their shocking quality, their obnoxiousness, 
and even their alarming impact is not enough” to allow for prior restraint 
by the government, the Supreme Court of Illinois wrote.103 However, “if 
the speaker incites others to immediate unlawful action he may be 
punished in a proper case, stopped when disorder actually impends,” a 
legal formulation taken from Brandenburg.104 
 
Citing a U.S. Supreme Court case, the Supreme Court of Illinois noted 
that citizens “are often ‘captives’ outside the sanctuary of the home and 
subject to objectionable speech.”105 The Illinois Supreme Court—
quoting verbatim from a U.S. Supreme Court case related to a person’s 
ability to wear a jacket upon which was written “Fuck the Draft”—
concluded: 
 
The ability of government, consonant with the 
Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others 
from hearing it is, in other words, dependent upon a 
showing that substantial privacy interests are being 
invaded in an essentially intolerable manner. Any 
broader view of this authority would effectively 
empower a majority to silence dissidents simply as a 
matter of personal predilections.106 
 
The KKK returned to the Supreme Court in 2003 after a Virginia court 
convicted local Klan leader Barry Black of cross burning, under a state 
statute that made it “unlawful for any person or persons, with the intent 
of intimidating any person or group of persons, to burn, or cause to be 





102 Vill. of Skokie v. Nat’l Socialist Party of Am., 373 N.E.2d 21, 25 (1978). 
103 Id.  
104 Id. 
105 Id. (quoting Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970)). 
106 Id. (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)). 
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place.”107 Additionally, “[a]ny such burning of a cross shall be prima 
facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons,” 
the statute continued.108 Black challenged the constitutionality of the 
statute on First Amendment grounds, and the Supreme Court took the 
case.109 
 
After concluding that “when a cross burning is used to intimidate, few 
if any messages are more powerful,”110 the Court analyzed this speech-
as-conduct within the context of First Amendment jurisprudence.111 It 
noted that “the First Amendment . . . permits a State to ban a ‘true 
threat,’” i.e., “statements where the speaker means to communicate a 
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to 
a particular individual or group of individuals.”112 Even a speaker that 
does not actually intend to carry out their threat would still be guilty of 
violating a state’s ban on true threats.113 The proscription is against 
speech designed to engender fear, rather than any physical act of 
violence that would follow said speech.114 Thus, a “true threat” crime is 
one of the mind, rather than the body, and does not require any 
relationship to “imminent lawless action,” as is the case with the free 
speech exception ordained in Brandenberg.115 While the Court 
ultimately concluded that Black’s conviction could not stand due to the 
“prima facie” language in the statute and the lack of clarity regarding 
his intentions,116 it nevertheless held that the “First Amendment permits 
Virginia to outlaw cross burnings done with the intent to intimidate.”117 
This holding, and its emphasis on intent, indicates that some statements 
made with a nefarious mens rea are devoid of First Amendment 






107 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 348 (2003).  
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 351-52. 
110 Id. at 357.  
111 Id. at 358-63.  
112 Id. at 359. 
113 Id. at 360.  
114 Id. 
115 See supra notes 77-87 and accompanying text. 
116 Black, 538 U.S. at 367. 
117 Id. at 363.  
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Statements made by hate-speech impersonator trolls should fall into this 
category. While the First Amendment protects offensive statements,118 
hate-speech impersonator trolls go beyond this line in the sand. They 
are not merely “disagreeable,” “distasteful,” and “discomforting”119; 
they are deceptive and dangerous. 
 
B. Anonymity and False Speech in the Eyes of the Law 
 
The emphasis on the invasion of substantial privacy interests in an 
“essentially intolerable manner”120 opens the door to the following 
question: Do impersonator trolls fit under this rubric? Before answering 
that question, one must examine the seminal Supreme Court case on 
false speech, U.S. v. Alvarez.121 
 
In Alvarez, the defendant lied about winning the Congressional Medal 
of Honor, and thereby violated the Stolen Valor Act of 2005.122 He 
challenged the validity of the Act, arguing that it was invalid under the 
First Amendment.123 
 
In evaluating the strength of Alvarez’s argument, the Court began by 
noting that content-based restrictions on free speech “have been 
permitted, as a general matter, only when confined to the few ‘historic 
and traditional categories [of expression] long familiar to the bar.’”124 
These categories of acceptable content-based restrictions on free speech 
include: “advocacy intended and likely to incite imminent lawless 
action”; obscenity; defamation; speech integral to criminal conduct; 
“fighting words”; child pornography; fraud; true threats; and speech 
presenting some grave and imminent threat that the government has the 






118 Id. at 358. 
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120 Vill. of Skokie v. Nat’l Socialist Party of Am., 373 N.E.2d 21, 25 (Ill. 1978). 
121 567 U.S. 709 (2012). 
122 Id. at 713. 
123 Id. at 714.  
124 Id. at 717 (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010)). 
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The Court then noted that “[a]bsent from those few categories where the 
law allows content-based regulation of speech is any general exception 
to the First Amendment for false statements,” a principle which 
“comports with the common understanding that some false statements 
are inevitable if there is to be an open and vigorous expression of views 
in public and private conversation, expression the First Amendment 
seeks to guarantee.”126 It is worth noting that the Court includes in this 
category of “false statement” both unintentionally erroneous comments 
and deliberately deceitful claims like Alvarez’s Congressional Medal of 
Honor lie.127 
 
The Court accepted the government’s point that false statements made 
in connection to “defamation, fraud, or some other legally cognizable 
harm associated with a false statement, such as an invasion of privacy 
or the costs of vexatious litigation,” can still be devoid of First 
Amendment protections.128 Other examples of “regulations on false 
speech that courts have generally found permissible” include “the 
criminal prohibition of a false statement made to a Government 
official”; statutes punishing perjury; and prohibitions against 
impersonating a government official or falsely claiming that one speaks 
on behalf of the government.129 Furthermore, the Court noted that “there 
are instances in which the falsity of speech bears upon whether it is 
protected. Some false speech may be prohibited even if analogous true 
speech could not be.”130 
 
In evaluating the validity of the Stolen Valor Act, the Court took 
umbrage at the fact that the Act “applies to a false statement made at 
any time, in any place, to any person” and “seeks to control and suppress 
all false statements on this one subject in almost limitless times and 
settings.”131 The Court noted that were it “to hold that the interest in 
truthful discourse alone is sufficient to sustain a ban on speech, absent 





126 Id. at 718.  
127 See id. at 718-19.  
128 Id. at 719.  
129 Id. at 720.  
130 Id. at 721.  
131 Id. at 722-23. 
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would give government a broad censorial power unprecedented in this 
Court’s cases or in our constitutional tradition,” a power that the First 
Amendment cannot allow to stand.132 
 
The Court then went through the elements needed for an appropriate 
content-based restriction on free speech: (1) that there is a compelling 
government interest behind the restriction; (2) that the restriction is 
narrowly tailored so as to be “actually necessary” to achieve the 
compelling government interest and be the “least restrictive means 
among available, effective alternatives”; and (3) “a direct causal link 
between the restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented.”133 The 
Court stated that the government failed to present a causal link between 
the Stolen Valor Act and any supposed injury related to liars like 
Alvarez.134 Additionally, the government failed to show why the 
restriction was narrowly tailored so as to prevent the harm, when 
counterspeech—i.e., openly refuting the claims of liars like Alvarez—
would accomplish the same goal without harming free speech.135 
 
The “remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true,” the Court 
declared.136  
 
This is the ordinary course in a free society. The response 
to the unreasoned is the rational; to the uninformed, the 
enlightened; to the straightout lie, the simple truth . . . . 
The theory of our Constitution is ‘that the best test of 
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in 
the competition of the market.’137  
 
It remains unclear how well this logic holds up under the rigors, size, 
scope, and speed of the internet, particularly in circumstances in which 
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134 Id. at 726, 729.  
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However, a 2018 case called Sandvig v. Sessions shined a spotlight on 
the intersection between false speech and the internet.138 The plaintiffs 
were four professors and the publisher of The Intercept online news 
platform.139 They were “conducting studies to respond to new trends in 
real estate, finance, and employment transactions” to determine whether 
algorithms and online automated decision-makers were unintentionally 
engaging in discriminatory behavior.140 As part of their studies, the 
plaintiffs engaged in “outcomes-based audit testing,” which “involves 
accessing a website or other network service repeatedly, generally by 
creating false or artificial user profiles, to see how websites respond to 
users who display characteristics attributed to certain races, genders, or 
other classes.”141 The plaintiffs used bots to create and manage fake user 
profiles, i.e., sockpuppets, to visit real estate and employment websites, 
and then collected data about these site visits and web usage.142 Using 
this data, the plaintiffs intended to “determine whether race-associated 
behaviors caused the [sockpuppets] to see different sets of properties” 
and “whether hiring websites’ algorithms end up discriminating against 
job seekers based on protected statuses like race or gender.”143 
 
The plaintiffs were aware of the fact that these activities violated the 
Terms of Service (“ToS”) for certain websites, and thus exceeded their 
“authorized access.”144 They brought their lawsuit to challenge the 
Access Provision of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”), 
which states that “[w]hoever . . . intentionally accesses a computer 
without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains 
. . . information from any protected computer . . . shall be punished.”145 
 
The plaintiffs argued that the ToS, and by extension the Access 
Provision of the CFAA, were unconstitutional because they prohibited 





138 315 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2018). 
139 Id. at 8-9. 
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145 Id. at 8 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C)). 
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protected under the First Amendment.146 In other words, plaintiffs 
contended that they either needed to refrain from legal activity or 
“expose themselves to the risk of prosecution under the Access 
Provision of the CFAA.”147 Consequently, they sued Jefferson B. 
Sessions, the then-U.S. Attorney General, to challenge the law.148 
 
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia upheld the 
plaintiffs’ as-applied challenge to the Access Provision of the CFAA 
but dismissed the broader claims of First Amendment overbreadth.149 
On the subject of false speech and sockpuppets, the court noted that 
“plaintiffs have a First Amendment interest in harmlessly mispresenting 
their identities to target websites.”150 Citing Alvarez, the court stated that 
false speech is protected by the First Amendment so long as it is 
harmless.151 
 
However, this principle does not answer the questions of whether any 
type of harmful falsehood would receive First Amendment protection 
and, if so, how much harm is required to remove a false statement from 
First Amendment protection. Nevertheless, the court’s conclusions on 
harmless falsehoods are inapplicable in cases of racist or misogynistic 
impersonator trolls targeting protected classes because their actions are 
designed to cause harm. 
 
This emphasis on harm and injury also came up in one of the most 
famous impersonator-troll cases: Golb v. Attorney General of the State 





146 Id. at 10. 
147 Id.  
148 Id. at 8. Interestingly, in a summary judgment ruling in this case, the court held that ToS 
violations did not violate the Access Provision of the CFAA and were therefore not criminal 
actions. See Sandvig v. Barr, 451 F. Supp. 3d 73 (D.D.C. 2020). Consequently, plaintiffs’ 
conduct was not in fact criminal, their as-applied challenge to the CFAA was mooted, and the 
Court “need not wade into the question whether plaintiffs’ proposed conduct should receive 
First Amendment protection.” Id. Following Sessions’s departure from the Department of 
Justice and William Barr’s appointment as attorney-general, the case was recaptioned 
“Sandvig v. Barr” for the summary judgment portion of the case. 
149 See Sandvig v. Sessions, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1, 28, 30 (D.D.C. 2018). 
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scholars in an attempt to support his father’s academic position about 
the authorship of the Dead Sea Scrolls.153 Golb’s father Norman claimed 
that the Scrolls were written by various authors (the “Golb Theory”), 
while other academics believe that an ancient Jewish sect known as the 
Essenes wrote the Scrolls (the “Essenes Theory”).154 
 
In mid-2008, Golb created a fake email address to impersonate Frank 
Cross, a reputable Scrolls scholar who had taught at Wellesley and 
Harvard.155 Using this false identity, Golb as Cross sent an email 
disparaging Bart Ehrman, a proponent of the Essene Theory.156 In the 
fall of 2008, Golb published an article under the pseudonym “Peter 
Kaufman” in which he accused another Essene Theory proponent, 
Lawrence Schiffman, of plagiarizing some of Norman Golb’s work.157 
Golb also created the email address “larry.schiffman@gmail.com” and 
used this account to send one message to four of Schiffman’s graduate 
students and a second message to every member of Schiffman’s 
academic department at New York University.158 Both emails 
referenced Golb’s “Peter Kaufman” article accusing Schiffman of 
plagiarism.159 Golb then sent more emails from his Schiffman account 
to the Dean and Provost of NYU.160 Golb as Schiffman also forwarded 
his email to the Dean over to NYU’s student newspaper, with the added 
line, “I must ask you not to publish a word about this.”161 
 
Shortly thereafter, Golb created the email address 
“seidel.jonathan@gmail.com” to impersonate Jonathan Seidel, a 
professor of Judaic Studies at the University of Oregon.162 As Seidel, 
Golb asked the Royal Ontario Museum, which had recently opened a 
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at the museum.163 Golb also used his Seidel persona to ask the exhibit’s 
curator whether she would respond to Norman Golb’s critique of the 
exhibit.164 The Seidel email address was also used to send emails to 
dozens of Scrolls scholars, but these emails also included an 
unfavorable critique of Norman Golb’s work.165 
 
Golb was convicted in a New York state court, but his case was later 
taken up at the federal level in a habeas proceeding.166 The federal court 
only dealt with nine state convictions for criminal impersonation and 
ten convictions for forgery in the third degree.167 Golb challenged the 
constitutionality of the statutes behind both sets of convictions.168 
 
The New York criminal impersonation statute states: “A person is guilty 
of criminal impersonation in the second degree when he … 
[i]mpersonates another and does an act in such assumed character with 
intent to obtain a benefit or to injure or defraud another[.]”169 To 
maintain the constitutionality of the statute, the New York state court 
construed the “injure” and “benefit” language narrowly such that they 
cannot mean “any injury or benefit, no matter how slight.”170 Instead, 
the term “injury” “is limited to intent to cause 1) ‘a tangible, pecuniary 
injury,’ 2) ‘interfere[nce] with governmental operations,’ or 3) harm to 
‘reputation.’”171 However, “a prank intended to cause temporary 
embarrassment or discomfiture” would not satisfy the injury element 
required by the statute.172 
 
Ultimately, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the 
constitutionality of the criminal impersonation statute.173 While the 
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for their sockpuppetting, Golb’s actions targeted specific individuals, 
and so comparing his actions to those of hate-speech impersonator trolls 
is inapt. That being said, the statute itself does not require impersonating 
a specific person, but rather “impersonat[ing] another,” and so 
impersonating a stereotypical Jewish person, for example, rather than a 
named Jewish person, may still satisfy the language of the statute.174 
 
The Court concluded in Alvarez that the First Amendment “protects the 
speech we detest as well as the speech we embrace.”175 But while the 
First Amendment protects detestable speech, it does not protect 
detrimental or damaging speech, as the Court noted when discussing 
restrictions against defamation, perjury, fraud, and the like.176 
Impersonator trolls targeting people online because of the targets’ race, 
religion, sex, or gender cross the line from merely detestable to clearly 
detrimental.177 
 
The Court wrote that “[o]nly a weak society needs government 
protection or intervention before it pursues its resolve to preserve the 
truth.”178 Yet the United States may be facing signs of a society 
weakened by digital deceptions, particularly when it comes to large-
scale efforts to spread disinformation. The Court continued that “[t]ruth 
needs neither handcuffs nor badge for its vindication,”179 but targeted 
minorities may need these protections from falsehoods designed to harm 
them as a group. 
 
IV. The Internet, as Dictated by Section 230 and Interactive 
Computer Service Providers 
 
Even if there was currently a way to use the law to punish impersonator 
trolls, internet entities like Google, Facebook, and Twitter, which 





174 See infra Part IV. 
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protected by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.180 This 
piece of legislation is ostensibly designed “to encourage the 
development of technologies which maximize user control over what 
information is received by individuals, families, and schools who use 
the internet and other interactive computer services” and “to ensure 
vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish 
trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of 
computer.”181 
 
The term “interactive computer service” encapsulates social media 
platforms, and includes “any information service, system, or access 
software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple 
users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system 
that provides access to the Internet.”182 
 
To encourage the development and use of interactive computer services, 
Section 230 provides them with immunity for actions and posts created 
by individual users.183 The statute states that “[n]o provider or user of 
an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or 
speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider.”184 
 
Cornell Law School Professor James Grimmelmann referred to Section 
230 as the “single most important piece of law” discussed in his 
textbook on internet law.185 
 
The basic idea of Section 230 is simple: if I post a 
defamatory video to YouTube, I’m the one who should 
be held liable for it, not YouTube. But . . . the exact scope 





180 See 47 U.S.C. § 230.  
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courts have chosen to interpret Section 230 broadly—
creating a kind of immunity with no offline parallel.186 
 
A. Zeran: The Case That Shook the Web 
 
Zeran v. America Online, Inc., the foundational case in this area of the 
law, “illustrates the crucial early decisions by the courts to read Section 
230’s immunities broadly.”187 The plaintiff, Kenneth Zeran, sued 
America Online (“AOL”) for “unreasonably delay[ing] in removing 
defamatory messages posted by an unidentified third party, refus[ing] 
to post retractions of those messages, and fail[ing] to screen for similar 
postings thereafter.”188 The third party in question posted a message on 
an AOL bulletin board on April 25, 1995, describing the sale of “shirts 
featuring offensive and tasteless slogans related to the April 19, 1995, 
bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma 
City.”189 Timothy McVeigh, the perpetrator of the attack, killed 168 
people—including 19 children—and injured several hundred more.190 
The bombing was the deadliest act of domestic terrorism in the nation’s 
history.191 
 
The third-party AOL message instructed people interested in buying the 
offensive shirts to call “Ken,” and provided Zeran’s home phone 
number.192 Zeran received death threats and a large number of outraged 
calls about the shirts from people who believed that he was the one 
behind the message.193 Unfortunately, he was unable to change his 
phone number because he relied on it for his business.194 Later that day, 
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reassured him that the post would be removed but added that AOL 
would not post a retraction as a matter of policy.195 
 
The next day, another similar message was posted, and once again, 
interested buyers were directed to call Zeran’s number and ask for 
“Ken.”196 Over the next four days, similar messages continued to show 
up on AOL’s bulletin board.197 Zeran faced another wave of angry, 
threatening phone calls.198 He repeatedly called AOL about the 
problem, and company representatives told him that AOL would soon 
close the individual account from which the messages were posted.199 
To put the problem into perspective, “[b]y April 30, Zeran was receiving 
an abusive phone call approximately every two minutes.”200 
 
The problem worsened when an announcer for an Oklahoma City radio 
station received a copy of the first AOL posting.201 The announcer 
relayed the contents of the posting on air, and urged the audience to call 
Zeran’s number.202 Due to this radio broadcast, Zeran became 
“inundated with death threats and other violent calls from Oklahoma 
City residents.”203 He called the police, who began to surveil his home 
for his own safety.204 Zeran also called the radio station to explain the 
situation, and once again turned to AOL for help.205 The number of calls 
to Zeran’s home fell to only fifteen calls a day by May 14, after an 
Oklahoma City newspaper ran a story exposing the AOL posting as a 
hoax and after the radio station made an on-air apology.206 
 
Zeran filed his lawsuit against AOL on April 23, 1996, alleging that 
AOL was liable for defamatory speech initiated by a third party because 
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duty to remove the post promptly, notify its subscribers of the post’s 
false nature, and screen for similar defamatory material in the future.207 
AOL argued that Section 230 was an affirmative defense, in that it 
allegedly “immunized interactive computer service providers from 
claims based on information posted by a third party.”208 
 
The court rejected Zeran’s argument and held in favor of AOL, 
emphasizing that Section 230 clearly gave protection against lawsuits 
like Zeran’s to online service providers and platforms like AOL: 
 
By its plain language, § 230 creates a federal immunity 
to any cause of action that would make service providers 
liable for information originating with a third-party user 
of the service. Specifically, § 230 precludes courts from 
entertaining claims that would place a computer service 
provider in a publisher's role. Thus, lawsuits seeking to 
hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a 
publisher's traditional editorial functions—such as 
deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter 
content—are barred.209 
 
In the eyes of the court, the language of Section 230 made it “plain that 
Congress’ desire to promote unfettered speech on the Internet must 
supersede conflicting common law causes of action.”210 The court noted 
that this immunity stemmed directly from Congress’ chosen policy “not 
to deter harmful online speech through the separate route of imposing 
tort liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for other parties’ 
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B. Contemporary Criticism of Section 230 
 
In addition to “promot[ing] unfettered speech on the Internet,”212 
Congress enacted Section 230 “to encourage service providers to self-
regulate the dissemination of offensive material over their services.”213 
However, many people now feel that online service providers are not 
doing enough to self-regulate.214 They argue that online service 
providers are using their Section 230 immunity to avoid taking any 
responsibility for both their own actions as pseudo-publishers of online 
content as well as the actions of their users.215 Moreover, these online 
service providers are commercializing their immunity at the expense of 
the public.216 Federal Trade Commissioner Rohit Chopra condemned 
social media companies for their destructive business models in 2019, 
writing that these models “generate[] profits by turning users into 
products, their activity into assets, their communities into targets, and 
social media platforms into weapons of mass manipulation.”217 
 
Social media platforms’ refusal to take action is “as unsurprising as it is 
depressing,” Boston University School of Law Professor Danielle Keats 
Citron noted, in that “[a]llowing attention-grabbing abuse to remain 
online accords with platforms’ rational self-interest.”218 Since “[s]ocial 
media companies earn advertising revenue when users like, click, and 
share,” those companies will promote and preserve whatever content 
causes people to pay more attention, even if that content misinforms or 
incenses readers.219 In other words, divisive rhetoric brings in the 
dollars, a culture clash just means more cash, and strife is success. This 
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are so inclined.220 As Citron aptly elucidated, “[w]hen it is bad for 
business, platforms have expended resources to stem abuse.”221 
 
Even Senator Ron Wyden, co-author of Section 230, has been critical 
of today’s tech giants for their failure to regulate online speech.222 In an 
address on the floor of the Senate on March 21, 2018, Wyden hammered 
home on the flawed outcome of Section 230 protecting online service 
providers that commercialize their immunity while abstaining from 
meaningful self-regulation:223  
The tech giants state that no one could track the 
millions of posts or videos or tweets that cross their 
services every hour. Nobody is asking them to do that--
nobody. Section 230 means they are not required to fact-
check or scrub every single post or tweet or video, but 
there have been far too many alarming examples of 
algorithms that drive vile, hateful, or conspiratorial 
content to the top of the sites that millions of people click 
on every day. Companies seem to aid in the spread of 
this content as a direct function of their business models. 
It is perfectly reasonable to expect some greater 
responsibility from these giant, multibillion-dollar 
corporations that were able to thrive as a result of 
protection that they were guaranteed by law. That was 
the idea behind Section 230. That doesn't carry any 
obligation to suppress free speech, but it is definitely 
about being a responsible citizen, a responsible member 
of the community. 
Sites like Facebook, YouTube, and Tumblr 
constitute the entire Internet for millions of users who 
click through the same group of sites every single day. 
They have an undeniable role to play in fostering a civil 
environment. Their failure to do so could very well mean 
that the Internet looks very different 10 years from now, 
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driven filth, but for the millions of decent people who 
use the Internet to learn, to find entertainment, and to 
keep in touch with loved ones. 
There was a time when the biggest Internet 
companies had mottos like “Don't be evil.” Perhaps it is 
time for them to aspire to a more modest motto: “Don't 
spread evil.”224 
 
V. Proposals and Conclusions 
 
The problem of impersonator trolls targeting members of a protected 
class can be framed in terms of hate speech and anonymity. As 
Brandenburg demonstrated, a person has the right to espouse hate 
speech so long as they do not incite others to engage in imminent lawless 
action.225 Similarly, the Alvarez case enshrined a person’s right to speak 
falsely, anonymously, and/or pseudonymously.226 
 
But what happens when these two rights intersect? Such a scenario 
occurs when an impersonator troll pretends to be a member of a 
protected class—and in so doing takes on a pseudonym—and espouses 
hate speech or spreads misinformation in an effort to harm members of 
the impersonated class by co-opting the credibility afforded to a member 
of that protected class. Do the overlapping rights to espouse hate speech 
and to speak through a pseudonym protect impersonator trolls, or should 
their efforts be curtailed as a matter of law? 
 
I argue that impersonator trolls that target minorities or other protected 
classes are inherently harmful to society and should be outlawed. This 
would entail either classifying hate-speech impersonator trolls under 
one of the traditional exceptions to free speech protection or carving out 
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Like the crime in Black,227 hate-speech impersonator-trolling 
demonstrates a malicious intent. Like the crime in Chaplinsky,228 hate-
speech impersonator-trolling “by [its] very utterance inflict[s] injury” 
on the safety and wellbeing of minorities, and damages society as a 
whole by manipulating segments of the population into attacking one 
another. As for Brandenburg, it is clear that impersonator trolls 
espousing hate speech online can incite people to engage in imminent 
lawless action.229 Moreover, hate-speech impersonator trolls engage in 
deception and disinformation, rather than the “mere advocacy” 
protected by Brandenburg.230 Lastly, a statute criminalizing hate-speech 
impersonator-trolling would also be in line with Skokie—even though 
that case is not binding on a national level—because of the “essentially 
intolerable manner” in which minorities are being targeted.231 
 
A. A Proposed Statute Against Hate-Speech Impersonator 
Trolls 
 
To combat hate-speech impersonator trolls, I advocate a statute making 
it illegal to use a false identity that possesses a specific trait or 
characteristic—such as race, religion, or gender—to harm people that 
genuinely possess that specific trait or characteristic. Examples of that 
harm include spreading disinformation about a protected class or 
engaging in a false-flag operation in which an impersonator troll uses 
their false identity to suggest that members of a protected group 
maintain hateful positions so that average citizens will develop 
antipathy toward that protected group.232 The Supreme Court has 
already established the validity of a similar statute, holding in 
Chaplinsky that a “statute punishing verbal acts, carefully drawn so as 
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A statute against hate-speech impersonator-trolling would curtail free 
speech, but the question arises: Would a court consider it a content-
neutral restriction or a content-based one? 
 
As a general rule, laws that by their terms distinguish 
favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of 
the ideas or views expressed are content-based. By 
contrast, laws that confer benefits or impose burdens on 
speech without reference to the ideas or views expressed 
are in most instances content-neutral.234 
 
Content-neutral restrictions on free speech are subject to the 
intermediate level of scrutiny,235 and can be characterized as 
“reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions.”236 This kind of 
restriction is valid so long as it is “justified without reference to the 
content of the regulated speech,” “narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant government interest,” and “leave[s] open ample alternative 
channels for communications of the information.”237 
 
The proposed statute against hate-speech impersonator-trolling targets 
the manner in which these trolls convey their opinions, in that it prevents 
them from using a specific false identity and does not prevent them from 
publishing the content of their statements. The significant government 
interest would be preventing the harm caused by hate-speech 
impersonator trolls. Lastly, the statute leaves open the possibility of 
publishing the content of their opinions under their own name or under 
a more generic pseudonym like “Web-Of-Lies1,” 
“SalazarSlytherinSpeaks,” or “I.Am.An.Extremist.” Thus, the statute 
provides for ample alternative channels of communication, and would 
likely be upheld if faced with a constitutional challenge. 
 
Even if a court considered the proposed statute to be a content-based 
restriction, it would likely still be constitutional. Content-based 
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there is a compelling government interest behind the restriction; (2) that 
the restriction is narrowly tailored so as to be “actually necessary” to 
achieve the compelling government interest and be the “least restrictive 
means among available, effective alternatives”; and (3) that there is “a 
direct causal link between the restriction imposed and the injury to be 
prevented.”238 
 
It is clear that hate-speech impersonator trolls present a serious threat.239 
Their disinformation and false-flag operations threaten the health and 
safety of minority communities.240 They also threaten to tear apart this 
country along political and racial lines.241 Thus, the compelling-interest 
element behind the proposed statute would be preventing the harm to 
society and minorities caused by hate-speech impersonator trolls. 
 
Likewise, the proposed statute is narrowly tailored, in that it only targets 
impersonator trolls, and leaves open options for people to express 
themselves through an inoffensive pseudonym or under their own name. 
Consequently, a person could still engage in free speech, and introduce 
their thoughts into the marketplace of ideas; they would only be banned 
from using a false identity to co-opt credibility as part of their illicit 
online machinations. As a result, the proposed statute would likely 
satisfy the “least restrictive means” element of the strict-scrutiny test for 
content-based restrictions, if it were considered to be such a restriction 
at all. Lastly, there would be a direct link between the proposed statute 
and the harm it aims to prevent, in that the proposed statute would allow 
law enforcement personnel to take down hate-speech impersonator 
trolls that attack minorities. 
 
I argue that this proposed statute is in line with other statutes and cases 
regulating free speech, such as those related to fraud or true threats. In 
fact, courts have restricted speech for comparatively minor reasons. As 
one example, consider San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. 
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of the “commercial value” of the term “Olympic.”242 If the Court is 
comfortable restricting free speech so as to prevent the co-opting of 
commercial value, it should be amenable to restricting free speech for 
the purposes of preventing the co-opting of the credibility inherently 
afforded to a person speaking about their own experiences as a member 
of a protected class. 
 
B. Public Pressure Against Tech Giants and a Push to 
Change Section 230 
 
Those seeking to fight impersonator trolls can do so by pressing online 
service providers to take steps against these bad actors. Entities like 
Google, Facebook, Twitter, Spotify, and Reddit can easily choose to 
enforce their Terms of Service against impersonator trolls, if they want 
to do so. Frequently, these companies will only take action against 
racists and other bad actors after facing public outcry.243 Unfortunately, 
in some cases, online service providers will only act after extremists 
have killed someone.244 It should not take an act of murder, the threat of 
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mob to shame online service providers into action, but sadly this is often 
the case. Generating a wave of bad press can prompt both tech giants 
and elected officials into action. 
 
Failing the creation of a new statute targeting hate-speech impersonator 
trolls, lawmakers can still combat these bad actors by altering Section 
230 so as to allow people to sue online service providers that do not 
engage in significant efforts to crack down on hate-speech impersonator 
trolls. Such a modification to Section 230 would compel online service 
providers to regulate their platforms, and thereby cut down on 
impersonator trolls’ ability to operate. 
 
There have already been calls from politicians to alter or eliminate 
Section 230.245 Former President Trump has called to repeal Section 
230, and has waged a months-long war on social media platforms.246 On 
May 28, 2020, Trump issued an executive order that targeted both 
Section 230 and social media platforms for their alleged political bias 
against the then-president.247 The executive order came in response to 
Twitter’s decision to label two of Trump’s tweets as “potentially 
misleading.”248 The tweets decried mail-in ballots, claiming that they 
would be “substantially fraudulent” and would result in a “rigged 
election.”249 There is little evidence to support Trump’s claims about the 
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Data from Facebook actually shows that right-wing content dominates 
the social media platform and frequently outperforms content from 
other news organizations.251 In the months ahead of the 2020 election, 
Trump pressured Senate Republicans to amplify their efforts against 
social media platforms.252 Former Senate Judiciary Committee 
chairman Lindsey Graham, an ardent and frequent Trump supporter, 
introduced a bill on September 21, 2020, designed to “modify the scope” 
of Section 230’s liability shield.253 Several prominent organizations 
strongly oppose the bill, arguing that it weakens efforts to combat digital 
disinformation.254 Similarly, in June 2019, Republican Senator Josh 
Hawley introduced a bill that would cause online service providers to 
lose their Section 230 immunity if they fail to prove that their 
moderation efforts are politically unbiased.255 Representative Paul 
Gosar, a Republican congressman from Arizona, introduced a similar 
bill in the House a few weeks later.256 
 
Tech companies have faced scrutiny on the other side of the aisle as 
well. In April 2019, Democratic Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi 
openly expressed her dissatisfaction with the status quo surrounding 
Section 230.257 In her view, society had entered a “new era” in which 
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the past.258 “[Section] 230 is a gift to them, and I don’t think they are 
treating it with the respect that they should,” Pelosi told Kara Swisher 
on the Recode Decode podcast.259 “And so I think that that could be a 
question mark and in jeopardy . . . . For the privilege of 230, there has 
to be a bigger sense of responsibility on it, and it is not out of the 
question that that could be removed.”260 
 
President Joe Biden has also been harshly critical of social media 
platforms and Section 230.261 During an interview with The New York 
Times editorial board that was published January 17, 2020, Biden said 
that Section 230 should be revoked because companies like Facebook, 
through their use of Section 230’s liability shield, are “propagating 
falsehoods they know to be false” and are “totally irresponsible.”262 
 
There have also been bipartisan attempts to reform Section 230.263 On 
September 28, 2020, Democratic Senator Joe Manchin and Republican 
Senator John Cornyn co-sponsored a bill that would hold online 
interactive platforms liable if they fail to report criminal activity.264 
Similarly, in March 2020, Graham and Democratic Senator Richard 
Blumenthal introduced the EARN IT Act, which would remove the 
liability shield from online service providers that do not follow 
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bill would create a 19-member commission charged with drafting up 
those best practices.266 The bill received broad bipartisan support.267 
 
While some of these pieces of proposed legislation have faced harsh 
criticism,268 they nevertheless represent a willingness in Washington to 
modify Section 230. Lawmakers could take a similar approach to fight 
back against hate-speech impersonator trolls, though this proposed 
effort would strive to avoid any controversies like the fight over 
encryption sparked by the EARN IT Act.269 
 
C. Prosecuting Impersonator Trolls for Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress and Criminal 
Impersonation 
 
Another way to fight impersonator trolls may be through other laws like 
those prohibiting intentional infliction of emotional distress and 
criminal impersonation. However, bringing a lawsuit for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress can be challenging in this regard, given 
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In that case, the Westboro Baptist Church picketed outside the funeral 
of Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder, a soldier killed in the line 
of duty.271 Albert Snyder—the father of the fallen solder—alleged that 
Westboro intentionally inflicted emotional distress on him272 because of 
the hurtful nature of Westboro’s signs.273 The Court held that “[w]hat 
Westboro said, in the whole context of how and where it chose to say it, 
is entitled to ‘special protection’ under the First Amendment, and that 
protection cannot be overcome by a jury finding that the picketing was 
outrageous.”274 
 
That being said, 
 
[w]hile Snyder clearly expressed a broad view of 
“special protection” for speech on matters of public 
concern, even where it is false and “insulting” or 
“outrageous,” it can be asserted fairly that the First 
Amendment protection described in Snyder does not 
extend to speech that is not “honestly” believed, or that 
is used as a weapon simply to mount a personal attack 
against someone over a private matter.275  
 
Cases involving hate-speech impersonator trolls could satisfy this 
limitation, and thereby see impersonator trolls’ harmful hate speech lose 
its First Amendment protection. 
 
As for criminal impersonation, the argument would be that since an 
impersonator troll has impersonated a person—for example, a Jewish 
person or a Black, female person—they would be guilty of violating a 
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The law is currently unfit to fight against impersonator trolls in a 
meaningful, conclusive manner, and as such, it should be modified—
either through the passage of a new statute, through modification to 
Section 230, or both. Public pressure can create opportunities to change 
the status quo. Regardless of the methodology used to combat hate-
speech impersonator trolls, it is clear that their disinformation 
campaigns and false-flag operations represent harmful actions against 
both minorities and the U.S. as a whole. For the good of the nation, they 
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